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Abstract
When attempting to read malicious network traﬃc, security analysts are challenged to
determine what attacks are happening in the network at any given time. This need to
analyze data and attempt to classify the data requires a large amount of manual time
and knowledge to be successful. It can also be diﬃcult for the analysts to determine
new attacks if the data is unlike anything they have seen before. Because of the everchanging nature of cyber-attacks, a need exists for an automated system that can
read network traﬃc and determine the types of attacks present in a network. Many
existing works for classification of network attacks exist and contain a very similar
fundamental problem. This problem is the need either for labeled data, or batches of
data. Real network traﬃc does not contain labels for attack types and is streaming
packet by packet. This work proposes a system that reads in streaming malicious
network data and classifies the data into attack models while dynamically generating
and reevaluating attack models when needed.
This research develops a system that contains three major components. The first is a
dynamic Bayesian classifier that utilizes Bayes’ Theorem to classify the data into the
proper attack models using dynamic priors and novel likelihood functions. The second
component is the dynamic model generator. This component utilizes the concept of
a cluster validity index to determine the proper time to generate new models. The
third component is a model shuﬄer. This component redistributes misclassified data
into attack models that more closely fit the behaviors of the data. Malicious packet
captures obtained from two network attack and defense competitions are used to
demonstrate the ability of the system to classify data, successfully and reasonably
create new attack models, and shuﬄe the data into more closely related models.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

In the field of cyber security, the information gained from network attacks continuously increases. As new vulnerabilities are discovered within a network and as the
tools used by attackers become more sophisticated, the abilities and methods of the
people attacking the network evolve as well. These attackers are also continuously
changing and developing their tactics for attacking a network. Many current attackers
use simple techniques that are often more diﬃcult to detect. Advanced techniques
are rare and are used sparingly [19]. Because of this, if new attacks are used against
a network that the analyst is not familiar with, the attack could remain undetected
until severe damage is done to the network. Because of these developments, security
analysts face diﬃculties in determining the types of attacks being used against their
network in a reasonable time period. The quick evolution of cyber-attacks, presents
a need for a robust system that can read malicious network activity and either classify them into existing attack models, or create a new model based on the observed
activity. The main challenges in developing such a system is that the large amount
of traﬃc entering a network is unlabeled for attack types and streaming.
While security analysis methods exist to classify attack types, they contain two major flaws. Current methods require some ground truth knowledge of attack types in
order to categorize diﬀerent attacks. This requirement of ground truth knowledge
limits the abilities of current methods to identify and classify new or rare attacks.
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Many current methods also analyze the data in large batches and does not classify the
traﬃc as it enters the system. This limits the ability of security analysts to quickly
and eﬀectively determine ongoing attacks within the network and could prevent them
from taking the necessary measures to stop the attacker and preserve their important
information. NASS, a system developed and described by Strapp [16] attempts to
resolve these problems. NASS uses dynamic Bayesian analysis to classify incoming
malicious network traﬃc data into attack models, either by classifying the data into
the model that most closely matches the data, or by creating a new model that better
fits the new data.
This work presents a system to solve the problem of classifying streaming unlabeled
malicious network traﬃc. Malicious network attacks as referred to in this work are
not any specific malware or exploits. Instead, malicious network attacks describes
the presence of malicious activities occurring between IP Address pairs on the network. These activities are then evaluated and classified based on the specific features
(ports, protocols, etc.) observed in the traﬃc between the IP Addresses. The main
components of the system are outlined below:
• A dynamic Bayesian classifier including a Bayesian prior probability calculation
based on the time series analysis of the data being input into the system
• A new way of dynamically creating attack models using graphical properties of
an Attack Social Graph as opposed to a simple threshold
• A method to measure the quality of the attack models to trigger shuﬄing of
the data inside the models to ensure the accuracy of the classification
This work develops a system that is able to accurately classify streaming malicious
network traﬃc into diﬀerent attack models based on the specific features of the observables. The novel contributions include:
Dynamic Model Generation Because of the nature of the data having no ground
3
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truth knowledge of how many models, or the features of any existing models, the
ability to dynamically generate models based on the observed network traﬃc is vital
for accurate classification. This work presents a way to determine when to generate
models using a cluster validity index to determine the quality of the classifications.
Model Shuﬄing Because of the nature of the streaming data, as classification is
done it is possible that the classification is not fully optimal as misclassification may
occur. Because of this possibility, a way to shuﬄe data into the existing models to
change optimize the classification was developed.
Dynamic Bayesian Prior In using Bayes’ Theorem for the classification of the
network traﬃc, an informative Bayesian prior is important to allow for proper classification. Because of the lack of ground truth knowledge in the data, a true Bayesian
prior does not exist. For this reason, a dynamic Bayesian prior was developed to
describe the probability of the model adding new edges based on the information
present in the previously classified data.

4

Chapter 2
Related Works

While works exist to solve the problems of classifying network attacks, classifying
unlabeled data, and classifying streaming data the three problems are rarely tackled
together. The problem to be solved in this work is the ability to classify unlabeled,
streaming, network attack data which combines these three concepts. The method
presented in this work is that of a dynamic classifier that is constantly assessed
with a cluster validity index. Sections 2.1 and 2.2 explore works in network attack
classification. Section 2.1 discusses general methods for recognizing network attacks
while Section 2.2 expands on the concept of using a social graph to model network
attacks and further explores the NASS framework. Section 2.3 explores clustering,
a common method of classifying unlabeled data, along with the general concept of
cluster validity indexes. Section 2.4 discusses works that exist to classify streaming
data.

2.1

Network Attack Recognition

The need to recognize network attacks is already a well known problem. Early works
created taxonomies of network attacks. These taxonomies attempt to collect information on known attack strategies and compile a list so that a network attack can
be recognized after it has occurred. Two popular and widely accepted taxonomies
described by Hansman & Hunt [8] were Howard’s taxonomy, written in 1997, and
5
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Lough’s taxonomy, VERDICT, written in 2001. Howard’s taxonomy groups attacks
based on the motivations and objectives of the attacker, as well as the results of the
attack while VERDICT provides a characteristic based attack taxonomy that describes how the attack happened, for example, if insuﬃcient validation requirements
exist for access to the system.
As network attacks have grown more sophisticated, the tools used to model them
have become more sophisticated as well. Al-Mohannadi et al. [2] provide an overview
of some of the more popular methods of modeling network attacks. Attack graphs
are the most commonly used method of attack modeling in computer science because
it allows for searchability within a computer system or an algorithm. Attack graphs
are used to identify the vulnerabilities of a system, how attacks can happen on the
network, and a set of actions that can be taken to prevent an attacker. The purpose
of an attack graph is to identify any and all potential attacks on the network. The
kill chain model is the model used by the United States Department of Defense both
in modeling cyber attacks, as well as attacks on the battlefield. A kill chain describes
how an attack is performed as a chain of actions from reconnaissance to action on
the objectives. A Capability-Opportunity-Intent (COI) Model is a method of attack
modeling that is used for intrusion analysis and represents an attacker’s motivation
rather than their attack path. When using this model, the attack is described by the
personality and capabilities of the attacker, the infrastructure of the network being
attacked, and the defendability of the attacker [15].
Building on the attack graph model, Aguessy et al. [1] presented a Bayesian Attack
Model (BAM) for dynamic risk assessment. This work combines the ideas of a topological attack graph and a Bayesian network in order to probabilistically represent
all possible attacks in an information system. The attack graph is based on a directed graph where the nodes, the hosts and IP addresses, are topological assets and
the edges represent possible attack steps between these nodes. The Bayesian attack
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graph developed is an extension of the attack graph based on a Bayesian network
where each node represents a host in a specific system state and the edges represent
possible exploits between a source host and a target host. The BAM uses a modified Bayesian attack graph with topological nodes that are assets of the information
system and edges that are attack steps. These edges represent an attack that allows
the attacker to move from one topological node to the next and describes how the
attacker moves between the nodes, for example through an exploitation of a vulnerability or a theft of credentials. The nodes are also associated with a random variable
that describes either the state of the node being compromised or the success of an attack step. Through this BAM, all possible attacks on a network are probabilistically
mapped out so that an analyst can see where the major vulnerabilities in the system
are.
More recent works regarding the recognition of network attacks have mainly been
done in the area of intrusion detection systems. Many of these types of systems exist
and their purpose is to detect an intruder in the network so that preventative measures can be taken to either stop the attacker from progressing through the network
or prevent an intrusion from the same entry point from happening again. Two such
examples are the works by Subba, Biswas, & Karmakar [18] and Haddadi, Khanchi,
Shetabi, & Derhami [7].
While intrusion detection systems are becoming more sophisticated and more accurate they continue to have two major drawbacks. The first is that intrusion detection
systems often raise large numbers of false positives in the data. The second is that
any intrusions detected must be evaluated by a security professional to determine the
proper course of action to be taken. One way to solve these problems is to integrate an
attack classifier into the intrusion detection system as explored in the works of Luo,
Wen, & Xian [12] and Bolzoni, Etalle, & Hartel [3]. Luo et al. use a Hidden Markov
Model combined with Dempster and Shafer evidence theory for classification while
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Bolzoni et al. use Support Vector Machines (SVM) and the RIPPER rule learner
comparing byte sequences from alert payloads. The major drawback of comparing
byte sequences for classification is that attacks that do not involve a payload, i.e.
port scan or DDOS, cannot be classified.
The problem with current attack classification systems is that they require training
in order to perform the classification. Because of this, new or rare attacks become
very diﬃcult to classify. In order to mitigate this risk, Yang, Du, Holsopple, & Sudit
[21] propose a semi-supervised system to classify network attack behaviors in asset
centric attack models. These asset centric attack models group collective evidences
and create models based on these groups. Evidences that have similar features are
classified into the same attack model using a Bayesian classifier to create an attack
behavior model, which is a collection of feature probability distributions.

2.2

Attack Social Graph and the NASS Framework

The concept of using a social graph to describe network attacks is described by Du &
Yang [6]. This work describes the use of an Attack Social Graph (ASG) to describe
attacks on a network. In this work, features are extracted from this graph and used
to determine any patterns that can be seen in the data. Principle component analysis
(PCA) is used to reduce the feature space and hierarchical clustering is used to group
sources of attacks that demonstrate similar behaviors.
The work by Du & Yang was then expanded upon by Strapp [16] in his creation of the
NASS framework. In his work, Strapp built upon the concepts set forth by Du & Yang
by using dynamic Bayesian Analysis to determine the probability of a new data point
of malicious network traﬃc belonging to an attack model. He abstracts all individual
observables in a data set into edges on the ASG with the source and destination IP
Addresses being the nodes. These edges are then used to create dynamic models
in the attack social graph. Each of these models describes a single attack behavior
8
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and inherits its features from the edges that are classified into it. Iterative Bayesian
Analysis in this work uses Bayes’ Theorem to classify attack behaviors into attack
models. If the behavior does not closely match any of the existing models, a new
model will be created using that behavior as the basis for the new model’s features.
As edges are classified into the models, the features of the models are modified to
include the features on the edges that are classified into the model. Because of this, the
models change as new edges are classified into them. This can lead to major problems
in the classification because the edges are also changing when new observables are
added to them. Because the edges are classified upon creation, as they change with
new observables being added, the model that the edge is initially classified into may
not be the best fit for that edge as time goes on. For this reason, a way is needed
to periodically change which model an edge is classified to if a better fit becomes
apparent.
Two other challenges that exist in the NASS framework are the creation of a new
model, and the Bayesian prior probability. In the original NASS framework, a generic
model was used to determine when to create a new model. The generic model was
a static model that contained features that was intended to fit all behaviors with a
modest probability. Whenever a new edge was to be classified, the probability of
it belonging to any existing model would be determined. If the edge had a higher
probability of belonging to the generic model then any of the other models, a new
model would be created for the edge. The problem raised when using the generic
model is that even if a new behavior enters the system, if it has a higher probability
of belonging to an existing model then the generic model, a new model will not be
made and the edge will be classified to the existing model. The generic model would
also have to be continuously updated so that it would continue to match all behaviors
with a modest probability.
The Bayesian prior probability in the NASS framework utilizes information about the
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ASG to determine the probability of an attack model before considering the features in
the observables. The prior probability is calculated using the idea of graph eﬃciency
and is determined by how centralized the models in the ASG are by attempting to
infer collaborating groups of IP Addresses at a target. While this is a valid strategy
and often times collaborating groups of IP Addresses will exist, at the core this prior
is not strictly ”Bayesian”. A Bayesian prior probability, by definition, should give
an idea of which model the edge should be classified without being influenced by the
features on the edge or models. Using graphical properties of the models breaks this
definition.

2.3

Clustering

Clustering is a very popular method of classifying any sort of data and can be used
to classify data without any ground truth knowledge. However, clustering has two
major drawbacks. The first is that clustering requires knowledge of all data points at
the same time for the clustering to be successful. The other is that it can be quite
diﬃcult to determine how successful a clustering has been without expert knowledge
of the dataset or ground truth labels. In order to solve this second problem, the works
of both Wang, Wang, & Peng [20] and Kovacs, Legancy, & Babos [10] explore the
use of cluster validation indexes to determine the quality of a clustering algorithm.
These validation indexes take into account the separation between clusters along with
the closeness of data points within the same cluster to determine if the clustering is
reasonable. These cluster validation indexes are used to determine the quality of a
clustering algorithm using the graphical properties of the clusters. This also translates
into a quality assessment of the classification being done by the algorithm. This work
uses the cluster validation index and to constantly analyze the quality of classification
in order to assist in determining when to dynamically generate new models and when
the classification is no longer suﬃcient.
10
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2.4

Classification of Streaming Data

Classification of streaming data as opposed to data sets is a growing problem but one
that is still relatively new. Streaming data is defined as data that enters the system
one observable at a time. One common method for the classification of streaming
data is to use ensemble algorithms such as those described by Street & Kim [17]
and Kuncheva [11]. These ensemble algorithms are built by combining the results of
multiple types of classifiers on a subset of the data stream. The final classification is
then determined by voting. Another common practice for classifying streaming data
is to store data points in memory until a small subset is gathered and then performing
the classification on these data chunks. The classification can either be done using
an ensemble algorithm as done by Street & Kim and Kuncheva, or by clustering
as described by O’Callaghan [14]. This work addresses the common problems in
streaming data classification by classifying unlabeled observables one at a time as
they enter the system as opposed to holding the data in memory and classifying
subsets of the data stream. This work also classifies using a Bayesian classifier as
opposed to ensemble algorithms.

11
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Methodology

The framework developed does not classify observables themselves. Instead, the observables, in this case malicious network packet capture data, are abstracted to edges
in the Attack Social Graph (ASG). The edges in the ASG are made up of a collection
of all network traﬃc between two IP Addresses acting as nodes. As observables enter
the system and are added to the edges, the features of the observable are added to the
feature histograms on the edge. These edges are then classified into the attack models
that characterize diﬀerent attack behaviors. The models represent a collective behavior of malicious attributes from all edges classified to the model. The assumption
driving this abstraction is that activity over a single edge between two IP Addresses
in a short period of time will be indicative of one single behavior. As edges are classified to models, the feature histograms of the edges are added to those of the model.
This abstraction can be seen in Figure 3.1.
The framework developed contains three separate parts that work together to solve

Figure 3.1: Abstraction Levels

the problem of classifying unlabeled streaming network attack data. The first is a
12
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Bayesian classifier. The Bayesian classifier is the main portion of the system and is
the block used to classify the network attack data into attack models. The second
block is a dynamic model generator. The notion of dynamic model generation is a
response to the data containing no ground truth of how many or what types of models
exist. The dynamic model generation is used to determine at what point a new attack behavior becomes present in the data and creates new attack models from these
behaviors. The third block is a model shuﬄing block. In classifying streaming unlabeled data, the models created are ever changing. For this reason, it is reasonable to
assume that, over time, some of the attack data will be classified into models that no
longer represent the behavior of the data. For this reason, the model shuﬄing block
was developed to periodically reassess the classification and, if needed, reclassify the
data into diﬀerent attack models. These three blocks are shown in Figure 3.2.
The first portion of the framework is the Bayesian classifier. This classifier con-

Figure 3.2: Classification and Model Generation Overview

tains the calculations for the likelihood and the Bayesian prior, and combines them
to calculate the Bayesian posterior used for classification. This portion is described
in Section 3.1.
The second block is the dynamic model generation. This block uses the concept of
a cluster validity index to generate cyber attack models. This block is described in
Section 3.2.
The third block is the model shuﬄing block. Contained in this portion is the triggering, edge reclassification, and stopping criteria to shuﬄe edges within existing models.
This portion of the framework is described in Section 3.3.
13
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Section 3.4 describes how the three blocks work together to complete the dynamic
model generation and classification process.

3.1

Dynamic Bayesian Classifier

The dynamic classifier developed builds on the NASS framework developed by Strapp.
This classifier assumes that the framework contains reasonable features for the observables being classified and proper Bayesian likelihood probability calculations for
these features. At the time of this work, the features existent in the framework are:
• Network Protocol
• Source Port
• Destination Port
• Source Port Transition Matrix
• Destination Port Transition Matrix
The source and destination port transition matrices are the probability that an attacker will change from using one source or destination port to using another.
This dynamic classifier was developed to solve the problem of classifying streaming
attack data. As such, the classifier assumes that all incoming data is analyzed independently and in a set order. The classifier utilizes Bayes’ Theorem shown in (3.1).
Section 3.1.1 describes the equation used to calculate the likelihood and Section 3.1.2
describes the equations used to determine the prior.
P rior Likelihood

z }| { z }| {
P (Ω) P (x|Ω)
P (Ω|x) ∑
P (Ωi )P (x|Ωi )

(3.1)

Ωi

An example of the ASG can is shown in Figure 3.3. In this graph, the black nodes
represent each IP Address in the system. The colored edges represent the traﬃc from
14
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one IP Address to the other. The colors of the edges represent to which model the
edge has been classified.
The models being created are non-parameterized and are expressed as a collection

Figure 3.3: Example Attack Social Graph

of distributions of each attribute of malicious activity. An example of the feature
histograms present on a model can be seen in Figure 3.4. This example contains
three separate feature histograms describing the Destination Port, Source Port, and
Network Protocol features. Each bar on the histogram represents the count for an
individual value for that feature (ex. Destination Port = 22).
When a new observable is analyzed, it is added to the edge on the ASG between

Figure 3.4: Example Model Feature Histograms

the observable’s source and destination IP Addresses. If no such edge exists, it is
15
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created and added to the ASG. At the point of creation, the edge is classified to
either an existing attack model in the system, or is used to generate a new attack
model. Section 3.2 details the dynamic model generation process. If a new model is
not created, the edge is classified to the maximum a posteriori model. Algorithm 1
describes the process of analyzing an observable in the system.
Algorithm 1 Add Observable
1: function addObservable(p)
2:
if p.sourceIP not exist in ASG then
3:
ASG.createN ode(p.sourceIP )
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:
21:
22:

3.1.1

if p.destIP not exist in ASG then
ASG.createN ode(p.destIP )
if edge between p.sourceIP and p.destIP not exist in ASG then
e = ASG.createEdge(p.sourceIP, p.destIP )
for model m in ASG do
e.calculateLikelihood(m)
e.calculateP osterior(m)
classif y(e)
else
e = ASG.getEdge(p.sourceIP, p.destIP )
e.add(p)
ASG.updateP riors()
for model m in ASG do
e.calculateLikelihood(m)
mod = e.getM odel()
for edge ed in ASG do
ed.calculateLikelihood(mod)
for model m in ASG do
ed.calculateP osterior(m)

Likelihood

The likelihood calculation is done by determining the likelihood of a single model
feature histogram producing an edge feature histogram using the equation shown in
(3.2) where pi is the probability of a feature in a model (ex. if a model contains
three packets with destination port 66 out of ten total packets, pi = 0.3) and ei is the
number of instances of a feature on the edge (ex. if the edge contains four packets
16
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with destination port 66, ei = 4).

l=

∏

pei i

∑
( ei )!
× ∏
ei !

(3.2)

Then, Shannon entropy is used to determine the stochastic or deterministic nature
of the feature. If many diﬀerent feature values are seen on the same edge with a
similar number of occurrences, the edge displays a more stochastic behavior for that
particular feature. This entropy is then combined with the likelihood from (3.2) as
shown in (3.3) where E is the entropy value.

P (x|Ω)f = (1 − E)l + E

(3.3)

These likelihood with entropy values are then multiplied together for all features
present on the edge being classified as shown in (3.4). This multiplication assumes
independence of the individual features.

P (x|Ω) =

∏

P (x|Ω)f

(3.4)

f

3.1.2

Dynamic Bayesian Prior

In order to use Bayesian classification, it is important to have a Bayesian prior that
defines the probability of an edge belonging to an attack model without taking into
account the features in the model or in the edge. In order to obtain an informative
prior without any ground truth knowledge, the concept of a dynamic Bayesian prior
was explored. A dynamic prior is one that changes with the information available in
the system. Three diﬀerent priors were explored. Section 3.1.2.1 describes a uniform
prior based on the number of models that exist in the system. Section 3.1.2.2 describes
a prior based on the number of edges in each model in the system. Section 3.1.2.3
describes a prior based on time series analysis that determines the prior probability
17
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based on trends in the data.

3.1.2.1

Uniform

A uniform prior is the most basic and uninformative of the three priors. The uniform
prior is one that simply states that all models are equally likely to have new edges
classified into them. The value for the prior in this case is simply the inverse of the
number of models as shown in (3.5) where N is the number of models that exist in
the system.
P (Ω) =

3.1.2.2

1
N

(3.5)

Edge Based

An edge based prior is more informative than the uniform. This prior states that the
more edges a model contains, the more likely it is that new edges will be classified into
that model. This is similar to the standard Bayesian prior that provides information
based on the number of samples in each class. The value for this prior is obtained as
shown in (3.6) where nΩ is the number of edges classified in model Ω.
nΩ
P (Ω) = ∑
i nΩ i
3.1.2.3

(3.6)

Time Series Based

The time series based prior is the most informative and novel of the three priors
explored. This prior attempts to predict the number of edges classified into each
model based on the recent trends in the data. This prior states that more recently
active models will have a higher probability of gaining new edges. This prior was
developed using the concept of Holt-Winters double exponential smoothing. Double
exponential smoothing is often used in conjunction with data that shows a trend in
order to predict a value for the data at time t + m. The two equations used to form
18
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the prediction for t ≥ 2 are shown in (3.7) and (3.8), where α and β are smoothing
parameters.
st = αxt + (1 − α)(st−1 + bt−1 )

(3.7)

bt = β(st − st−1 ) + (1 − β)bt−1

(3.8)

For t = 1, the equations are shown in (3.9) and (3.10).

s1 = x1

(3.9)

b1 = x1 − x0

(3.10)

In order to predict a value beyond time t, the equation shown in (3.11) is used.

Ft+m = st + mbt

(3.11)

In the context of the Bayesian classifier, the value of Ft+m is modified in order to give
a valid probability value for the prior as shown in (3.12).
P (Ω) = ∑

Ft+1 Ω
Ωi Ft+1 Ωi

(3.12)

To use this prior in the classifier, the value for xt must be defined. In Holt-Winters
double exponential smoothing, xt is defined as the actual value of the data that is
being forecast at time t. Using this definition, it can be determined that, in order
for the prior to follow the definition of a traditional Bayesian prior, the value of xt
should be the same as the component being classified. Because of this, the value of
xt was chosen to be the number of edges classified into model Ω at time t.
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3.2

Dynamic Model Generation

As is the case with any sort of classification without ground truth knowledge of
the dataset, the problem arises of how to determine which models to create. If the
data was all to be collected and then analyzed, clustering algorithms could be used.
However, due to the streaming nature of the data, the models must be dynamically
created in real time as the data is being read into the system. This raises the challenge
of knowing at what point a new model must be created. The hypothesis discussed
in this section is to use the concept of a cluster validity index to measure the quality
of the ASG to aid in determining when these models should be created. Subsection
3.2.1 will discuss the concept of the cluster validity index and Subsection 3.2.2 will
describe how this concept can be used for dynamic model generation

3.2.1

Cluster Validity Index

Cluster validity indexes are used to measure the quality of a clustering algorithm.
There exist many diﬀerent indexes that take into account the separation between
clusters and the closeness of data points within the same cluster. In the context of
the Bayesian classifier, the clusters can be defined as the models the edges are being
classified to. For the purpose of this classifier, the Wemmert-Gançarski Index was
utilized. The equation for this index is shown in (3.13) where N is the total number
of clusters and nk is the number of data points in cluster k.
N
1 ∑
C=
nk Jk
N k=1

(3.13)

nk
1 ∑
Jk = max{0, 1 −
R(Mi )}
nk i

(3.14)

Jk is defined in (3.14).
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R(Mi ) is defined in (3.15) where di is the distance between point i and the centroid of
the cluster it is classified to, and d′i is the distance between point i and the centroid
of a cluster it is not classified to.

R(Mi ) =

di
min(d′i )

(3.15)

In the context of the Bayesian classifier, the concepts of clusters, data points, centriods, and distance must be defined for this index to be useful. As stated above, the
clusters are defined as the models in the ASG. As such, the data points, the elements
that form the clusters, can be defined as being the edges in the ASG. The concepts of
centroids and distance require a slightly more complex definition. Because the edges
on the graph are made up of many observables and contain the features of all the
observables, the edges do not have a definite physical point in feature space. The
same is true for the models as they are made from the edges and contain the features
of all observables on all edges in the model. However, using the posterior probability,
P (Ω|x), the concepts of centroids and distance can be defined simultaneously. By
definition, the posterior probability determines the probability that an edge belongs
to a model. The higher the posterior, the greater the probability is that an edge
belongs to a certain model. The opposite is true for the concept of distance from
a centroid in a clustering algorithm. As the distance between a data point and the
centroid of a cluster decreases, the probability that the data point belongs to that
cluster increases. Using these two definitions, the concept of distance between a data
point and the centroid of a cluster can be redefined in the context of the Bayesian
classifier as the inverse of the posterior probability of an edge belonging to a model
as shown in (3.16).
di =

1
P (Ω|xi )

(3.16)
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3.2.2

Attack Model Generation

The framework begins with a single empty model defined that the first edge created
is classified to. All subsequent edges will then be created and a decision will be made:
does an existing attack model suﬃciently represent the features present on this edge,
or should a new model be created? In order to make this decision, the WemmertGançarski Index is used. When a new edge is created and is to be classified, the
index is calculated to represent each of the two scenarios: the edge is classified to an
existing model, or a new model is created for the edge. In cluster validation, a larger
Wemmert-Gançarski Index indicates a superior clustering. As such, the decision of
whether to classify to an existing model or create a new model is made to maximize
the index value. Figure 3.5 shows the decision flowchart that is followed during the
dynamic model generation process.
Algorithm 2 describes the classification algorithm with new model generation. To

Figure 3.5: Model Generation Decision Flowchart

ensure that the number of edges in a model does not drive the decision to create a
new model or not, the index calculation is slightly modified to remove this weighting
as shown in (3.17).
N
1 ∑
C=
Jk
N k=1

(3.17)
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Algorithm 2 Classify Edge
1: function classify(e)
2:
if size of models
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:
21:
22:
23:
24:
25:
26:
27:

= 1 and (size of models.edges
e.getLikelihood(model) = 1.0) then
e.setM odel(model)
ASG.updateP riors()
for edge ed in ASG do
d.updateP osterior(model)
else
newM odel = ASG.createM odel(e)
newM odelIndex = ASG.calculateIndex()
newM odel.remove(e)
ASG.removeM odel(newM odel)
maxV al = 0
maxM odel = null
for entry ent in e.getP osteriors() do
if ent.getV alue() > maxV al then
maxV al = ent.getV alue()
maxM odel = ent.getKey()
e.setM odel(maxM odel)
ASG.updateP riors()
for edge ed in ASG do
ed.updateLikelihood(maxM odel)
for model m in ASG do
ed.updateP osterior(m)
maxM odelIndex = ASG.calculateIndex()
if newM odelIndex > maxM odelIndex then
maxM odel.remove(e)
ASG.createM odel(e)

=

0 or
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3.3

Model Shuﬄing

Because of the streaming nature of the data, when an edge is initially classified the
features on the edge are not fully representative of the features that will be present
further in the process. This idea drives the need for a method to periodically reassess
the completed classifications and reclassify edges if a model exists with a higher
posterior probability for that edge. The concept of model shuﬄing is a three part
problem. The first part is determining when this shuﬄe should occur. The second
is, once the shuﬄing is triggered, determining which edges should be reclassified
and into which models. The third is when the shuﬄing has suﬃciently reclassified
edges and should end. Section 3.3.1 outlines the method used to trigger the shuﬄing
algorithm. Section 3.3.2 describes the process of reclassifying edges into the proper
models. Section 3.3.3 describes the stopping criteria for the shuﬄing process.

3.3.1

Triggering Shuﬄing

To determine when model shuﬄing should occur, the Wemmert-Gançarski Index is
once again utilized. Because the index is a measure of the quality of the classification,
the value will rise and fall as new observables are added and new edges are classified.
For this reason, the index can be used to determine when the overall classification
of all edges is no longer suﬃcient. When this point is reached, the reclassification of
edges should begin in order to increase the overall quality. Put simply, if the index
value falls below a desired quality threshold (IT ), the model shuﬄing process will
begin.

3.3.2

Reclassifying Edges

Because of the nature of the data not containing ground truth knowledge of which
model the edges will ideally be classified to. For this reason, the ideal number of
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models present in the data is also unknown. Because of this fact, the assumption is
made that the current number of models when shuﬄing begins is suﬃcient.
When shuﬄing first begins, the prior for all models is reset to a uniform prior over all
models. This allows the reclassification of the edges to models to be based solely on
the features of the edges and the model. The process of shuﬄing is an iterative process
that continues until the stopping criteria is met. In each iteration, the posterior is
recalculated for each edge belonging to each model. After all posteriors are calculated,
the edges are classified into the model with the highest posterior for that edge. The
features in the models are updated to reflect the new edges classified and the process
repeats. At the end of each iteration, the priors for each model are updated based
on the number of edges contained in the model as shown in (3.6). This updated
prior allows for edges with multiple models with similar likelihoods to be classified
into the most likely model based on the prior. If a model contains no edges after the
reclassification, the model is removed from the ASG.

3.3.3

Stopping Criteria

In order to complete the model shuﬄing process, a reasonable stopping condition
must be defined. Ideally, the iterative edge reclassification process will converge to
static models with edges that no longer require reclassification. In this case, the index
will be at a local maximum and will not change between iterations. If this situation
is observed, the model shuﬄing will stop.
An alternative to convergence of the index is the case when the same edges continuously switch between the same models. In this case, an oscillation of the index value
will be observed. This oscillation also shows that further iterations of the reclassification are not needed. Therefore, if oscillation of the index value is observed, the
model shuﬄing will be completed. Algorithm 3 describes the entire model shuﬄing
algorithm once the trigger condition has been met.
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Algorithm 3 Classify Edge
1: function shuffle
2:
prevIndex = ASG.calculateIndex()
3:
secondP revIndex = 0
4:
ASG.calculateU nif ormP riors()
5:
repeat
6:
if not first iteration then
7:
secondP revIndex = prevIndex
8:
prevIndex = index
9:
for edge e in ASG do
10:
posteriors = new HashMap
11:
for model m in ASG do
12:
posteriors.add(m.getP oseterior(e), m)
13:
e.bestM odel = max(posteriors).getV alue()
14:
for edge e in ASG do
15:
e.setM odel(e.bestM odel)
16:
for model m in ASG do
17:
if m.numEdges = 0 then
18:
ASG.removeM odel(m)
19:
ASG.calculateEdgeP riors()
20:
index = ASG.calculateIndex
21:
until index == prevIndex or index == secondP revIndex
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3.4

System Flow

The classification and dynamic model generation system works by processing the
malicious network traﬃc packet by packet. First, the source and destination IP
Addresses are evaluated and a determination is made as to whether or not an edge
between the source and destination exists in the system. If so, the packet is added
to the edge and the posterior is updated for all edges and models. If the edge does
not exist, the posteriors are determined for the edge for each model by the Bayesian
classifier. The edge then enters the dynamic model generation block that determines
if the edge is classified to the maximum a posteriori model or if a new model is
created. The posteriors are then updated for all edges and models in order to perform
an accurate index calculation. If the index is below the threshold and the proper
number of iterations have passed since the previous shuﬄing, the model shuﬄing
block is triggered and the edges are shuﬄed into new models. Then, the next packet
enters the system and the next iteration begins. This process can be seen in Figure
3.6.

Figure 3.6: System Flow
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Chapter 4
Results

In order to demonstrate the ability of the system to successfully classify malicious
network traﬃc, dynamically create models, and periodically shuﬄe edges into better attack models, tests were run using malicious packet capture data. Section 4.1
describes the design of experiments, including the datasets and performance metrics
used to display the performance of the system. Section 4.2 explains the parameters
used in model shuﬄing and the eﬀects of changing these parameters on the overall
performance. Section 4.3 exhibits the eﬀect of the Bayesian prior and compares three
diﬀerent possible priors. Section 4.4 displays the ability of the system to successfully
generate new models when needed. Section 4.5 demonstrates the ability of the system
to shuﬄe edges into better attack models and the eﬀects of this shuﬄing. Section 4.6
shows a case study of the capabilities of the system as a whole.

4.1
4.1.1

Design of Experiments
Datasets

The first dataset used to exhibit the capabilities of the system contains 184,777 packet
captures of malicious network traﬃc from the 2012 Mid-Atlantic Collegiate Cyber Defense Competition (MACCDC) provided by Netresec [13]. This dataset contains malicious packet captures including attributes: Timestamp, Source and Destination IP
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Address, Source and Destination Port, Protocol, packet contents, and packet length.
The second dataset contains a subset of packet captures for the 2016 Collegiate Penetration Testing Competition (CPTC) provided by the competition organization team
[4]. This dataset was broken into two subsets taken approximately 4 hours and 15
minutes apart containing 20,000 malicious packet captures produced by ten teams
attempting to attack a given network. These packet captures contain Timestamp,
Source and Destination IP Address, Source and Destination Port, and Protocol information.
4.1.2

Performance Metrics

In order to determine the quality of the classification and model generation process,
performance metrics must be established. The metrics to be used in the quantitative
analysis of the system are defined below:
• Percentage of Time with Index Greater than 0.9 (I0.9 ) and 0.8 (I0.8 ):
These metrics are used to determine the overall graphical quality of the ASG
throughout running a dataset with respect to the Wemmert-Gançarski Index.
Using the definition of the index, these metrics show the amount of time that the
posterior probability of the edge belonging to the model it is classified to is ten
times greater than the posterior probability of the edge belonging to the model
with the next highest posterior, giving a posterior ratio of ten to one in the case
of the index greater than 0.9. In the case of the index being greater than 0.8, the
posterior ratio is five to one. Because the index uses the Posterior probability of
an edge belonging to the models, the index is not only measuring the graphical
quality of the ASG, but also the overall quality of the classifications that have
been completed by evaluating the quality of the separation of the models.
• Average Time per Packet (T P P ): This metric is used to determine the
speed of the system. This metric computes the average time from a packet
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being read into the system until the packet is fully processed. This includes
classification of new edges, recalculation of likelihood and posterior values for
all edges with respect to the model the edge containing the packet is classified
to, and any shuﬄing.
• Number of Shuﬄes (NS ): This metric is used to determine how often edges
are misclassified to the point where the current models are no longer suﬃcient.
This metric counts the number of times that shuﬄing occurs from the start of
the dataset until the end.
• Average Time to Shuﬄe(T T S): This metric is used to determine the speed
of the shuﬄing algorithm within the system. This metric computes the average
time of shuﬄing from the time shuﬄing is triggered until the stopping criteria
is reached.

4.2

Eﬀect of Changing Shuﬄing Trigger Parameters

When triggering shuﬄing within the system, two parameters are used to determine
when the shuﬄing should occur. The first is the index threshold (IT ). This is the
index value that the ASG must fall below before shuﬄing occurs. The second is the
minimum iterations before shuﬄing (NI ). This is the number of observables that
must enter the system between when shuﬄing occurs and when shuﬄing can occur
again. When these parameters are changed, the performance metrics are aﬀected.
Table 4.1 shows the eﬀect of changing the shuﬄing trigger parameters on the performance metrics using the three diﬀerent datasets.
The main trade-oﬀ in changing the shuﬄing trigger parameters is between shuﬄing
frequency and time. On average, the more frequently shuﬄing is allowed, the longer
the system takes to run. There is an example where this generalization is not true;
the case above where IT is 0.75. In this case, the I0.9 and I0.8 are higher for the case
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IT , NS
0.5, 500

0.5, 1500

0.75, 500

0.75, 1500

No Shuﬄing

CCDC
I0.9 = 91.09%
I0.8 = 93.57%
TPP = 103.43 ms
NS = 42
TTS = 3.73 sec
I0.9 = 0.28%
I0.8 = 0.65%
TPP = 27.86 ms
NS = 3
TTS = 1.46 sec
I0.9 = 92.50%
I0.8 = 94.86%
TPP = 101.04 ms
NS = 46
TTS = 3.60 sec
I0.9 = 19.38%
I0.8 = 73.10%
TPP = 24.07 ms
NS = 22
TTS = 8.57 sec
I0.9 = 0.21%
I0.8 = 0.38%
TPP = 30.19 ms

CPTC1
I0.9 = 2.27%
I0.8 = 4.42%
TPP = 191.91 ms
NS = 5
TTS = 2.75 sec
I0.9 = 3.10%
I0.8 = 8.15%
TPP = 171.13 ms
NS = 4
TTS = 5.21 sec
I0.9 = 25.83%
I0.8 = 49.76%
TPP = 215.07 ms
NS = 15
TTS = 44.52 sec
I0.9 = 16.78%
I0.8 = 44.06%
TPP = 278.89 ms
NS = 8
TTS = 46.60 sec
I0.9 = 0.12%
I0.8 = 0.37%
TPP = 123.05 ms

CPTC2
I0.9 = 12.16%
I0.8 = 34.94%
TPP = 77.91 ms
NS = 23
TTS = 2.58 sec
I0.9 = 7.12%
I0.8 = 7.49%
TPP = 82.87 ms
NS = 13
TTS = 9.50 sec
I0.9 = 2.68%
I0.8 = 23.35%
TPP = 110.25 ms
NS = 32
TTS = 8.63 sec
I0.9 = 20.69%
I0.8 = 29.94%
TPP = 89.29 ms
NS = 13
TTS = 12.08 sec
I0.9 = 0.07%
I0.8 = 0.09%
TPP = 46.33 ms

Table 4.1: Performance Metrics with Varying Shuﬄe Trigger Parameters

where NI is 1,500 is higher than the case where NI is 500. The reasoning for this can
be explained by examining the index graphs for these cases. The index graph for the
NI = 500 case can be seen in Figure 4.1 while the index graph for the NI = 1, 500
case can be seen in Figure 4.2.
In these cases, it can be seen that, although shuﬄing occurs more frequently in the
NI = 500 case, the index is unable to rise above the 0.8 and 0.9 values. This is an
example on why the shuﬄing algorithm in its current iteration is not optimal. Because the shuﬄing algorithm does not have the ability to add models to the ASG, it is
possible that one model could represent multiple attack behaviors. It is also possible
that shuﬄing too frequently does not allow for a suﬃcient number of observables to
enter the system to properly reclassify edges into better models.
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Figure 4.1: CPTC2 data with shuﬄe parameters IT = 0.75 and NI = 500

Figure 4.2: CPTC2 data with shuﬄe parameters IT = 0.75 and NI = 1500

In general, to select the parameters for shuﬄing it is preferred to allow enough time
between shuﬄing to allow for a suﬃcient number of packets to enter the system while
keeping the minimum index relatively high in order to allow for shuﬄing as the index
begins to fall.
The remainder of the results in Chapter 4 will be run with an IT of 0.75 and an NS of
1,500 observables. Sections 4.3 through 4.5 will be demonstrating the capabilities of
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the system using the MACCDC data and section 4.6 will be evaluating the eﬀect of
datasets on the system using both the MACCDC and CPTC datasets. These parameters were chosen because they provide clear examples to demonstrate the capabilities
of the system.

4.3

Eﬀect of Bayesian Prior

When classifying using Bayes’ Theorem, it is important to use an informative Bayesian
Prior in order to ensure accuracy of the classification. The Bayesian Prior by definition
is the probability of new evidence belonging to a model without bias based on the
features of the observable or the model. In this work, three Bayesian Priors were
explored. The first was a uniform prior based on the number of models. This is the
most naive prior for the system as it simply allows the likelihood calculation to fully
determine the classification of the edge to a model. The graph in Figure 4.3 shows the
uniform priors of each of the four models created by the system over each iteration
of packets entering the system.
The second Bayesian Prior explored was a prior based on the number of edges

Figure 4.3: Uniform Prior Over Iterations

in a model over the total number of edges in the ASG. This prior provides more
information for the classification as it assumes that a model containing more edges
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is more likely to have a new edge classified to that model. Figure 4.4 shows a graph
of the edge based priors for each of the four models over each iteration of packets
entering the system.
The third Bayesian Prior explored was the time series based prior defined in Section

Figure 4.4: Edge Based Prior Over Iterations

3.1.2. This Prior provides more information than the edge based prior as it takes into
account trends in the data. This prior assumes that models with more edges classified
recently will continue to grow while those that have not gained edges will continue
to maintain the edges that the models contain. Figure 4.5 shows a graph of the time
series based prior over iterations of the system.
Upon examination of the graphs of the edge based and time series based priors, the

Figure 4.5: Times Series Based Prior Over Iterations
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two priors appear to be identical. Looking closer at individual prior values it can be
seen that this is not the case. Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7 show the prior values for two
models in the first 100 iterations of the system using the edge based prior and the
time series based prior respectively.
From these two graphs it can be seen that the prior values using the edge based and

Figure 4.6: 100 Iterations Edge Based Prior

Figure 4.7: 100 Iterations Time Series Based Prior

time series based priors are similar but are, in fact, diﬀerent. This is to be expected
as both prior values depend on the number of edges in the models to calculate the
prior. Comparing these two graphs also clearly shows the eﬀect of trends on the time
series based prior.
In order to compare the eﬀects of the Bayesian Priors examined, plots of the index
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over each iteration of the system were created using each of the three diﬀerent priors.
Figure 4.8 shows the index graph using the uniform prior. Figure 4.9 shows the index
graph using the edge based prior. Figure 4.10 shows the index graph using the time
series based prior.
Examining these graphs, the index values for all three priors appear to be very

Figure 4.8: Index Using Uniform Prior

Figure 4.9: Index Using Edge Based Prior
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Figure 4.10: Index Using Time Series Based Prior

Index Value
Uniform
0.19232445376286245
Edge
0.19232445376286256
Time Series 0.19232445376286247
Table 4.2: Index Value at Iteration 1,501 Using Diﬀerent Priors

similar. This is expected as the posterior is driven mainly by the likelihood calculation
in Bayes’ Theorem. Table 4.2 shows an example of the index values at iteration 1,501
to show the eﬀect of the diﬀerent Bayesian Priors.
The diﬀerent Bayesian Priors were also examined using the relevant performance
metrics explained in Section 4.1.2. Table 4.3 shows the comparison of the three
diﬀerent priors using these performance metrics.
Using these metrics, it can be seen that changing the prior has little eﬀect on the
overall performance of the system. Again, this is as expected because of the idea in
I0.9
Uniform
19.38%
Edge
19.38%
Time Series 19.38%

I0.8
TPP
73.10% 28.79 ms
73.10% 27.85 ms
73.10% 27.16 ms

Table 4.3: Comparison of Priors Using Performance Metrics
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Bayes’ Theorem that the likelihood value should drive classification. The purpose of
the Bayesian prior is to determine which model is more likely to have new observables
classified to it in cases where the likelihood is very similar between models. For this
reason, the prior that provides more information about the models should be used
which, in this system, is the time series based prior.

4.4

Dynamic Model Generation

Because of the nature of the data having no ground truth data about the number
or composition of models, model creation is an important piece of the system. The
ability to dynamically generate models while data enters the system is essential for
the accuracy of the classification. A new model is to be generated when an observable
enters the system that does not fit well into any existing model. To demonstrate the
capability of the system to dynamically generate models, an example is shown where
three models exist and a new edge is created with features not prevalent in the existing
models. Figures 4.11 through 4.13 show the features present in the existing models.
The next edge to be created in the system is one with destination port 57,989,

Figure 4.11: Model 0 Features

source port 55,553, and TCP protocol, a feature combination not prevalent in any
of the existing models. The posteriors of the edge belonging to one of the existing
models are shown in Table 4.4.
To determine when a new model is to be created, the index is compared in the cases
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Figure 4.12: Model 1 Features

Figure 4.13: Model 2 Features

where the edge is classified to the highest posterior model, Model 2 in this example,
or a new model is created from the edge. Table 4.5 shows the index comparison for
this example.
Because the index value when a new model is created is larger, the new model is
introduced to the system. Figure 4.14 shows the features for the newly created model
showing the success of the dynamic model generation process.
Although the feature graphs for Model 2 and the new model appear to be very similar,
it is the values in these feature graphs that separate the two. Model 2 contains edges
with source port 137, destination port 137, and ICMP Protocol. The new edge and,
therefore, new model contain source port 55553, destination port 57989, and TCP

Model 0
Model 1
Model 2

Posterior
6.285 × 10−7
1.138 × 10−7
0.9999

Table 4.4: Posteriors of New Edge Belonging to Existing Models
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Index Value
Classification to Existing Model
0.333
Creation of New Model
0.4191
Table 4.5: Index Comparison for Model Generation

Figure 4.14: New Model Features

Protocol.

4.5

Model Shuﬄing

During the classification process, it is reasonable to assume that misclassification of
edges could occur. This is particularly true with no ground truth knowledge of the
models determining the features that should be present in each individual model. Because of this, it is important to have the ability to periodically reevaluate the models
the edges are classified to. Figure 4.15 shows an example of the index over iterations
in a system where shuﬄing is present. Figure 4.16 shows an example of the index
over iterations when shuﬄing does not occur. When comparing the two graphs, the
importance of shuﬄing is seen as the shuﬄing gives the ability for the index to rise
during the classification. This can also be seen in Table 4.1 comparing the cases where
shuﬄing is present to the case where no shuﬄing occurs.
To demonstrate the ability of the system to shuﬄe edges into models an example
is shown where the index falls below the threshold and the shuﬄing occurs after the
proper number of iterations. Figure 4.17 shows the index value leading up to and
after the shuﬄing. For this example, the shuﬄing occurs at iteration 1,501 even
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Figure 4.15: Index Over Iterations with Shuﬄing

Figure 4.16: Index Over Iterations with no Shuﬄing

though the index falls below the threshold of 0.75 before that. This occurs because
the parameter determining the minimum iterations between shuﬄing is set to 1,500.
From this graph, the shuﬄing can easily be seen to have occurred as the index
sharply rises. This happens because the posteriors of the edges belonging to the new
models they are classified to are much higher than the models that existed before
shuﬄing.
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Figure 4.17: Index at Shuﬄing

After shuﬄing, the models that were present before shuﬄing and those that exist
after are quite diﬀerent. Figures 4.18 through 4.24 show the features of the existing
models before shuﬄing for the above example. Figures 4.25 through 4.28 show the
features of the models after shuﬄing occurs. Clearly, after shuﬄing, the models are
much diﬀerent than before. For example, all edges with a source port of 137, contained in Models 2, 3, and 5 before shuﬄing, are in the same model, Model 5, after
shuﬄing. The same type of shift can be seen in the protocol feature as well as all
edges containing packets with an ICMP protocol, originally contained on Models 1,
2, 3, and 5, are contained in Model 5 after shuﬄing.

Figure 4.18: Model 0 Features Before Shuﬄing
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Figure 4.19: Model 1 Features Before Shuﬄing

Figure 4.20: Model 2 Features Before Shuﬄing

Figure 4.21: Model 3 Features Before Shuﬄing

Figure 4.22: Model 4 Features Before Shuﬄing
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Figure 4.23: Model 5 Features Before Shuﬄing

Figure 4.24: Model 6 Features Before Shuﬄing

Figure 4.25: Model 0 Features After Shuﬄing

Figure 4.26: Model 1 Features After Shuﬄing
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Figure 4.27: Model 2 Features After Shuﬄing

Figure 4.28: Model 3 Features After Shuﬄing

Figure 4.29: Model 4 Features After Shuﬄing

Figure 4.30: Model 5 Features After Shuﬄing
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Figure 4.31: Model 6 Features After Shuﬄing

4.6

Eﬀect of Dataset on Performance

As with any system, the data plays a role in the results and performance. In order
to understand the eﬀects of the data on the system, three datasets were tested with
diﬀerent numbers of packets, edges, and models. Table 4.6 displays the notable
statistics with respect to the processing time of each packet.
From this table, the eﬀects of data is clear. Generally, as the number of edges
Metric
CCDC
Number of Edges
604
Packets per Shuﬄe 8,398.95
# Models Created
6
# Models Removed
0
TPP
24.07 ms

CPTC1
1,522
2,500.00
9
2
278.89 ms

CPTC2
573
1,538.46
37
33
89.29 ms

Table 4.6: Eﬀects of Data on Performance

increases, the processing time also increases. This makes sense as an increase in edges
will cause an increase in calculations required to calculate the index at each iteration,
as well as increase the time required to shuﬄe. An increase of edges also increases
the number of times the classification process is required. If the number of edges is
comparable, the next largest eﬀect can be seen by the number of shuﬄes required
throughout the classification process. As the number of shuﬄes needed increases, the
time increases. This is also intuitive as shuﬄing takes far longer than processing of a
single packet.
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Conclusions

The classification and dynamic model generation process using the Bayesian Classifier
presents a way to mitigate the challenge of classifying streaming unlabeled malicious
network traﬃc data. The novel contributions of this work are:
Dynamic Bayesian Prior In using Bayes’ Theorem for the classification of the
network traﬃc, an informative Bayesian prior is important to allow for proper classification. Because of the lack of ground truth knowledge in the data, a true Bayesian
prior does not exist. For this reason, a dynamic Bayesian prior was developed to
describe the probability of the model adding new edges based on the information
present in the previously classified data. The uniform prior bases the prior value
on the number of models and assumes equal probability for all models. The edge
based prior bases the value on the number of edges in the models and assumes that
models with more edges are more likely. The time series based Bayesian prior using
Holt-Winters double exponential smoothing allows the system to take trends of the
data into account. By taking trends into account, more recently active models will be
more likely to have new edges classified than models that have little recent activity.
Dynamic Model Generation Because of the nature of the data having no ground
truth knowledge of how many models, or the features of any existing models, the ability to dynamically generate models based on the observed network traﬃc is vital for
accurate classification. Including dynamic model generation based on the Wemmert-
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Gançarski cluster validation index allows for the incorporation of graphical features
into the model generation process.
Model Shuﬄing Because of the nature of streaming data and the dynamically
changing models, it is reasonable to assume that edges will periodically be misclassified into incorrect models. For this reason, the concept of shuﬄing the edges within
the existing models based on the likelihood values was introduced. This ability to
shuﬄe edges allows for misclassified edges to be moved to the best model and also
allows the models to shift into more distinct attack behaviors.
Test data was provided both by Netresec and the CPTC competition and was used to
demonstrate the abilities of the system to classify edges into intuitive attack models,
including the ability to dynamically generate models and shuﬄe misclassified edges
into proper models. However, in analysis of the results, opportunities for future works
were discovered. The results were analyzed using the metrics of I0.9 and I0.8 as well
as TPP. From these metrics, it can be seen that the system performs well in terms
of the cluster validity index, as long as proper shuﬄing parameters are used, while
requiring improvements to the packet processing speed. These improvements will be
discussed further in Section 5.1.

5.1

Future Work

Live Streaming Capability
In order for the system to be more useful to security analysts, the ability for the
system to read and classify live information would be a major improvement. In its
current iteration, the system reads data files and performs the classification on the
data line by line. Being able to stream live information into the system would enhance the ability of a security analyst to determine the types of attacks present in
the network in real time.
In order for live streaming to be a feasible addition, enhancements to the overall ef48
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ficiency of the system are also required. These enhancements are:
Calculation Speedup In the current system, calculations for the posterior probability are completed in every iteration. These are done to ensure accurate values for the
index calculation as used for shuﬄing. Because of these calculations, as the number
of edges becomes large, the speed of the system decreases drastically. When this happens, it becomes unrealistic to expect the system would be able to handle live data
as a buildup of data would occur while processing packets. One option to solve this
problem is to only calculate the index when necessary. This could mean calculating
the index only when a new edge is introduced to determine model generation or on
occasion to ensure shuﬄing is still able to be triggered. While this would increase
the overall speed of the system, it would result in a decrease of accuracy because
shuﬄing could not occur immediately after the index falls below the threshold. It
would also result in a slowdown of the system when new edges are introduced as the
calculations that are currently done in every iteration would be forced to occur all at
once whenever the index is recalculated.
Shuﬄing Speedup In the current system, shuﬄing is a slow process. For this reason, shuﬄing in a live system would also result in a back log of data while the shuﬄing
occurs. For this reason, in order for live streaming to be possible, the shuﬄing process
requires an increase in speed. One possibility is to determine when the shuﬄing is
considered suﬃcient to avoid the case where individual edges change models for many
iterations.
Removal of Old or Unnecessary Observables In the current system, all observables are held in memory through the entire classification process. This causes the
system to use large amounts of memory and prevents the ability for live streaming
data from being realistic. One possibility to solve this problem is, once observables
have been in the system for a suﬃcient time, remove these observables. Another
option is to determine the point at which individual observables no longer has a large
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eﬀect on the features present on an edge. Once this point is reached, the edge can
contain the features and the observables present on the edge, or any new observables
on the edge, can be discounted. The drawback to this method would be the case
in which a large number of observables enter the system on that edge containing a
new behavior. If those observables are discounted, the features on the edge are no
longer an accurate representation of the edge’s behavior. Another option is to remove
the need for observables altogether. If the features were contained in the edge itself
instead of in observables, the system would not require the storage of the observables
at all.

Split Models in Shuﬄing
While the ability to shuﬄe models is an improvement on many streaming data classifiers, the possibility still exists for models to exhibit more than one distinct attack
behavior. In order to solve this problem, a method is needed to determine that a single
attack model contains multiple attack behaviors. Once this determination has been
made, individual models would be created to exhibit these unique attack behaviors
and the edges moved into these new models.
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